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PRESENT ACION DEL PROFESOR J. BUCHANAN 
Por Juan Hernández Andreu 
Vicedecano de la Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales 
Quiero agradecer al Club de debate de la U.C.M. su 
colaboración para que esté entre nosotros el profesor James 
BUCHANAN, Premio Nobel de Economía. 
Es un acontecimiento importante para la Facultad recibir al 
profesor BUCHANAN, a quien agradezco su presencia aquí esta 
tarde. Y agradecerle también que nos hable de un tema de tanta 
actualidad como es el proceso de integración europea desde una 
perspectiva norteamericana. 
En octubre de 1.986, hace pues sólo seis años, se le concedió el 
premio Nobel de Economía: "Por haber elaborado 105 fundamentos 
de 105 contratos teóricos y constitucionales en relación a la toma 
de decisiones económicas y políticas". 
Cuando se trata de hacer biografía de una persona se suele 
hablar del hombre y de su obra, pero en el caso del profesor 
BUCHANAN, ambos aspectos están profundamente relacionados. 
Nacido hace 73 años, en el Estado de Tennesse (USA), el 
pr'efesor Buchanan realizó allí sus primeros estudios, hasta 
obtener un Master de Ciencias en la Universidad de aquel Estado. 
Luego en 1948 se doctoró en la Universidad de Chicago. Un rasgo 
importante en la formación del profesor Buchanan es su 
conocimiento directo de los hacendistas italianos del siglo XIX, 
en los que observa un concepto del gobierno basado en el acuerdo 
mutuo entre ciudadanos, que ven los impuestos como pagos por 
servicios prestados por el Gobierno. 
Después de su estancia en Italia, el profesor Buchanan regresó a 
Estados Unidos, donde fue profesor de Economía y Director del 
THOMAS JEFERSON CENTER FOR STUDIES OF POLlTICAL ECONOMY 
AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY en la Universidad de Virginia, donde 
preparó los fundamentos de su Teoría de PUBLlC CHOICE y 
promovió la revista de este nombre para difundir el interés por su 
campo de estudio. 
En 1963 fue Presidente de SOUTHERN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION. 
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En 1972, Vice-Presidente de AMERICAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION. 
En 1980 fue miembro ejecutivo de MONT PELERIN SOCIETY. 
En 1986, como dije antes, recibió el Nobel de Economía. 
El profesor BUCHANAN, si bien es Dr. por la Universidad de 
Chicago, no ha seguido la corriente monetarista propia de esta 
escuela. A igual que Arrow y Stigler su obra arranca ante el papel 
creciente del Estado y se encuentra en la frontera de la 
Economía y de la Ciencia política, que Friedman ha calificado de 
aplicación del Análisis Económico al comportamiento político; y 
otros han dicho que su obra contribuyó al "imperialismo" de la 
Teoría Económica, al entrar en los terrenos del derecho y de la 
ciencia política. 
La originalidad del método de Buchanan radica en haber 
aplicado el análisis microeconómico al estudio de las decisiones 
políticas, en definitiva, según él, no se puede analizar la economía 
haciendo abstracción del proceso de decisión política. 
Si prestamos atención a la teoría del PUBLlC CHOICE 
observamos que son principios sobresalientes en ella:1) El papel 
central de los individuos;2) la motivación de los individuos por su 
interés propio; y 3) el proceso político como un medio de cambio. 
Lo cual, a mi juicio, tuvo alcance en el Acta Unica Europea, atenta 
a la "mayoría cualificada" frente a la "unanimidad", en el 
procedimiento de decisiones del Consejo Europeo. 
A las obras de Buchanan antes citadas habría que añadir otras 
tan importantes, entre las que destacan: Democracia sin déficits 
(1977) y El poder del impuesto (1980). 
Decía al principio la suerte que esta tarde tenemos de escuchar 
al profesor Buchanan, que nos hablará del proceso de integración 
europea desde una perspectiva norteamericana. El tema no podía ser 
más oportuno, cuando estamos viviendo la crisis en los mercados 
monetarios, que afecta a las economías europeas, como la de este 
país. Crisis y desintegración suelen ir juntas, según nos enseña la 
Historia Económica Contemporánea. De ahí la importancia de 
analizar las vías conducentes a la consolidación de una integración 
económica europea. Por tanto, le agradecemos al Dr. Buchanan que 
deje por unas horas su cátedra en el Centro de Estudios de Public 
Choice en George Mason University de Virginia y venga a 
enseñar sus conocimientos aquf. 
AN AMERICAN EVALUATION OF EUROPE'S 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROSPECT 
by 
James M. Buchanan 
1. Introduction 
A newly organized institute, Euro-92, was organized in France in late 1989, 
and I was invited to present a paper at its first conference, scheduled in Paris in 
May 1990, under the conference's general topic, "Does Europe Need a 
Constitution?" I wrote a paper that I presented at the conference under the title, 
"Europe's Constitutional Opportunity." My experience with that paper was unique 
in that, for the first time in my career, I found myself being attacked 
simultaneously by representatives of both the "right" and the "Ieft," by both those 
who opposed and those who supported movements toward European economic 
and political integration. The first group, represented primarily by British 
associates óf the Bruges group, more or less, took the leadership roles in the 
emerging Thatcher stance on Europeanization, the stance that rejects any and all 
sacrifice of separated national sovereignty and one that expresses fear at any 
usage of the very words "federal" or "federalism." The second group, 
represented primarily by the Brussels contingent, as spokesman for what is called 
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the Delors position, argued forcefully for the economic and political integration of 
Europe through centralized direction from the center, through widespread 
regularization and harmonization over the whole of the market of Europe. 
With attacks from both flanks, I was reinforced in my view that my paper 
must have been basically on target. I remain of that view, and I want to share 
with you, in late 1992, essentially the same argument that I advanced in 1990, but 
with the additional insights offered to us by two years of history, which includes 
the continuing revolution in 1991, and the continuing European discussion, and 
encompassing the Maastricht agreement and its generalized acceptance or 
rejection, whether formal or informal in nature, culminating finally in the financial 
difficulties of September 1992. 
In summary, my evaluation is quite positive about Europe's constitutional 
pros~ect. I am optimistic in the sense that I predict that Europe will, indeed seize 
the once-in-history opportunity offered. I interpret the events that have occurred, 
and particularly those that ha ve taken place in 1992, as confirming my 1990 
identification and classification of both the opportunity and the threats to its 
realization. The centrally-controlled, highly regulated and essentially socialized 
Europe, as presented in some of the extreme variants of the Delors position, is 
historically out of phase, and such a Europe surely must lose all credence in the 
postrevolutionary moment of the 1990's and beyond. The peoples of Europe, 
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through their behavior in 1992, in Denmark, France, and elsewhere, have shown 
clearly that they understand the world, of ideas and of institutions, better than 
their Brussels counterparts. At the same time, the European economy, as a 
single nexus within which goods, services, resources, and capital move freely in 
response to market incentives, this economy comesincreasingly to describe the 
emerging state of play, almost independently of political actions, and it appears to 
me highly unlikely that any political separatism can thwart economic 
Europeanization, which is both technologically and psychologically driven. (The 
United Kingdom may, just possibly, be an exception to this generalized 
prediction, but, even here, my own bet would be on continued Europeanization.) 
11. A Review of the Madisonian Ideal 
So much tor a summary of my argument. I acknowledge that the 
perspective expressed here may be characteristically American; hence the 
qualification in my title, "An American Evaluation .... " Our ideas and 
interpretations of events, as well as our evaluations and predictions, are 
derivative in part from our own cultures; including our particular histories, along 
with the reading of those histories by others before uso I have often noted that 
there is a basic difference between American and European "constitutional 
understanding," by which I mean differences in the bellef (or perhaps faith) that 
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the authority of political units, governments, can be constrained to act only within 
those limits set out in constitutional grants of power. Such an understanding 
rejects out of hand the familiar notion that political sovereignty must always be 
united in a single unit and that this sovereignty, as located, is necessarily 
unbounded. 
What I call the American constitutional understanding in this respect can 
perhaps best be discussed with reference to the ideal s that motivated James 
Madison in 1787, the man who, more than anyone else, was responsibl<3 for 
setting up the basic federal structure of governance for the United States. For my 
purposes, it becomes of no import that Madison's grand design ultimately failed, 
that the United Sta tes of this century do es not embody Madison's ideal of limited 
governance. It is the Madison of the late 18th century whose ideas I want to 
invoke with reference to the Europe of the 1990's, not the distortion of those 
ideas in the 19th and 20th centuries. 
James Madison recognized the advantages of an open internal market; he 
sought to insure that, as America developed and moved its borders westward, the 
movement of goods, persons, property; and capital, would not be inhibited by the 
machinations of petty provincial governments. Madison understood the teachings 
of Adam Smith; he knew that closed markets guarantee economic stagnation; 
that economic prosperity and growth depend critically on the size of the market, 
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with the larger and more open the market nexus the higher the rate of progress. 
But Madison had little or no faith in the ability and willingness of local politicians to 
act in terms of the "general interest" of the whole American community. He 
predicted that, if empowered to do so, local legislatures would erect protective 
barriers to trade and migration, that each unit would seek to secure differential 
advantage at the expense of others, with the consequent damage to all parties. 
Madison recognized that a strong central authority, a central government, must 
be established, with powers to prevent the localized political interferences with 
trade. 
At the same time, however, James Madison and his peers had little faith in 
the politicians who might come to positions of authority in the central government. 
The powers of this central government were, in the Madisonian vision, to be 
severely and strictly limited, by a formal constitutional structure. The ordinary 
political fUllctions were to be carried out by the separate states, constrainl:ld by 
the central government only with respect to their potential interferences with the 
workings of the internal market economy. 
In this Madisonian ideal, the separate states, all within the economic 
nexus, could effectively compete, one with another, in providing the climate, the 
infrastructure, for economic activity. Indeed, the prospects for free trade and 
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resource flows over the whole territory of the federalism insured against political 
exploitation within a single state. 
Madison and his peers also took it for granted, so much so that they did 
not consider It necessary to make an explicit statement, that the separate states, 
which were being asked to agree to form the federal union, retained the rights of 
secession from that union, once it was established. Had these rights of 
secession been challenged in the early discussions in the 1780's, there would 
never have be en a United States of America. The residual power to withdraw 
from the contract was inherent in the whole exercise. Little did Madison foresee 
that, less than a century later, Lincoln would fight, and win, a bloody civil war to 
establish just the opposite principie, that the separate states could not secede, 
that the central authority was inviolate along this dimensiono 
I do not want to go into the controversial arguments about either the origins 
or the morallegitimacy of Lincoln's position. I want, instead, to concentrate 
attention on the effects of the establishment of this position. Once the separate 
American states lost all rights of secession, the effective federal structure of the 
United States, the structure that was the centerpiece of Madison's grand design, 
was doomed. There was to be no potential secession to act as a check on the 
overreaching of the central federal authority, and there were no offsetting 
increases in constitutional restrictions on the powers of this authority to intervene 
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in the workings of the large internal market. Madison might well have predicted 
the growth of the American Leviathan in this century under these conditions. 
111. Comparison and Contrast 
At this point, my critic might say: "So What? The sketch of American 
constitutional history may be provocative, and even interesting, but it has little or 
no relevance to the European setting in the 1990's." This critic might go on to say 
that the separate American sta tes of the 1780's shared a common language, a 
common ethnicity, a common culture, and common legal institutions. Surely, the 
political integration of the artificially separate states into a federal union was, in 
any comparative sense, immensely more appealing than any proposed 
integration faced by Europeans today, Europeans who are citizens of separate 
nation-states, with differing ethnicity, differing languages, differing cultures, 
differing legal traditions. 
My response to such a critic is to say: "Point taken." And if, to employ 
economists' jargon here, other things were equal, the inference might be drawn to 
the effect that there is no basis for European integration at all. There exist, 
however, quitt3 different elements in any comparison across two centuries, as 
between the American states in the 1780's and the European nation-states in the 
1990's, elements that lend strong support for economic integration. 
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In the 1780's there was relatively little in strictly economic logic for the 
formation of the American federal union. Almost all economic activity was local in 
character; most economic value was produced, traded, and distributed locally. 
There were relatively few markets that extended even to the limits of provincial 
borders, and even fewer that extended to the geographicallimits of the nation 
and beyond. There were no supralocal financial institutions, and communication 
among persons over wide distances was both slow and costly. 
By dramatic contrast, in the 1990's the overwhelming share in economic 
value is produced, distributed, and traded across markets that are supranational 
in extension. A relatively small share in total product value is local inorigin and in 
use. Further, financial institutions are worldwide in organization, and 
instantaneous communication facilitates the transfer of assets at the speed of 
light. The developing technology of modern economic relationships offers strong 
impetus for the integration of markets over widely inclusive geographic areas, an 
impetus that, in my view, more than offsets the linguistic, cultural, and ethnic 
barriers that suggest localism. 
IV. Constitutional Constructivism and Spontaneous 
Economic Integration 
If my argument of 1990, and 1992, is broadly correct, and if Europe does 
confront a once-in-history opportunity to achieve economic and political 
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integration through the establishment of a genuine federal union, one that would 
offer the modern equivalent of Madison's early dream for America, how is this 
opportunity to be seized? The events that have occurred between 1990 and 
1992 offer sorne hints toward a possible answer to this question. 
In my 1990 Paris lecture, I was mistaken in my interpretation of European 
public attitudes In two quite different, even opposing, aspects.1 overestimated 
the impact of the revolutionary events of 1989 by assuming that the essentially 
socialist thrust behind Brussels bureaucratization of a federal Europa had, by 
1990, come to lose much of its credibility and persuasive force. To my surprise in 
Paris, and afier, I found that the Brusselization advocates seemed willing to 
proceed with their regularization-harmonization rhetoric as if the anti-socialist 
revolution had not, and was not, taking place at all, and that socialist nostrums 
had suffered no empirical reverses. Secondly, and to my even greater surprise, I 
found that the evident economic advantages promised by a wider and more 
integrated market were not sufficient to budge the strict nationalists, the little 
Englanders, from what economic theorists would call their "corner solutions." 
That is to say, these anti-Europeans seemed to allo,# tor no trade-offs at all in 
their refusal to consider prospects for féderal union. Even the words "federal" 
and "federalism" seemed anathema to those who took this extreme position. 
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Because of this combination of mistakes in interpreting European public 
attitudes, I was, in that Paris lecture, a naive constitutional constructivist. 
presumed that, because the opportunity seemed so self-evident to me, 
Europeans would somehow see the light and move toward implementation of the 
Europe-wise constitutional structure that would embody the establishment of a 
central authority, but with severely limited powers, more or less as Madison might 
have advised in some imaginary return to a modern consultative role. 
Such middle-way constitutionalism was not desti1ed to move directly to 
center stage. Instead, the Brussels attitude moved to dominate discussions for 
constitutional change, while accompanied by increasingly clamorous dissent from 
the anti-Brussels nationalists. The Maastricht agreement se'emed, initially, to 
reflect preliminary victory for constitutional constructivism of the Brussels variety, 
with specific proposals for European political integration as regularized and 
harmonized by Brussels, up to and including the gradual movement toward a 
common monetary unit along with a single European central bank. 
In 1992, however, we have witnessed referenda by citizens in Denmark 
and in France that suggest more difficulties for Brussels than might have been 
anticipated. These results were reinforced by the financial market disruptions in 
September 1992, which suggested that monetary integration might not be so 
easy as Maastricht had presumed. After these events in 1992, we commenced to 
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see statements by the BrUssels spokesmen that seemed to be based on a 
developing recognition that Maastricht was overly constructivist, that the 
regularization-harmonization aspects were too restrictive and that movement 
toward revision in the direction of genuinely competitive federalism along the Iines 
of a Madisonian structure might be in order. 
To some of the anti-European nationalists, the pulling back from the 
extremes of Maastricht suggests the end of European integration in any form 
resembling federal union. But su eh an attitude reflects a failure to understand 
that the "middle way" does indeed exist, as an opportunity, that, as of late 1992, 
seems even more realizable than it did in 1990. The failures of Maastricht to 
secure generalized public support must be placed alongside other developments 
in the 1990's which include, importantly, the continuing economic integration of 
Europe that has been taking place without specific political steps being taken. As 
almost any observer can see, there has been a spontaneo(Js Europeanization of 
the economic nexus throughout the area included in the community and beyond. 
Markets have been widened, borders have become, in many cases, effectively 
nonexistent. Customer and consumer loyalties to nationalized products have 
vanished. And this spontaneous integration of the European market does not 
seem Iikely to be checked soon by arbitrary and artificial national policies of the 
old-fashioned protectionist variety. 
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V. Minimal Constructivism as Response 
In my reading of current events in Europe, integration will proceed without 
the constructivist constitutional steps that I thought to be necessary in 1990, and 
surely without the extreme constructivism that Maastricht represents. I think, 
nonetheless, that citizens of Europe will make a serious mistake if they fail to 
seize the constitutional opportunity that still exists under current circumstances. 
As noted, the Brussels advocates seem to be on the verge of recognizing that 
their dreams for a dirigiste Europe have failed to excite the minds of their 
compatriots. There is surely room for compromise on a restricted, limited, and 
competitive federalization that will, effectively, guarantee against the emergence 
of nationalist excesses in the form of protectionist policies, while, at the same 
time, holding the powers of the central authority in check. 
A substantial change in the mindset of many Eurocrats will be required to 
make this limited federal union a reality. The thrust toward political enforcement 
of regularization and harmonization across the separate national boundaries must 
be replaced by the thrust toward effective competitiveness between and among 
these separate political entities. Instead of a common currency and a single 
central bank, Europe can prosper mightily with a set of competing currencies and 
competing central banks. Competition can be facilitated by a European 
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constitutional guarantee that any citizen in any country can make contracts in any 
currency. This guarantee would serve to place severe limits on the inflationary 
proclivities of any single country's central bank. Similarly, further implementation 
and extension of the norm that any good that meets regulatory requirements in a 
single country must be allowed free entry into the markets of all other countries 
can insure against special interest motivated market restrictions in single 
countries. 
VI. German Hegemony 
I should be remiss if I failed to discuss the potential dominance of a unified 
Germany, along the effects that fears of such dominance on the willingness of 
citizens throughout the rest of Europe to allow integration to go forward. On this 
point, as elsewhere, however, account must be taken of the relationship between 
the range and scope of a central federal authority and the potential influence of 
the dominant partner. 
There can be no denying that European federal union would be more 
readily accepted, almost regardless of its organizational structure, if Germany 
were not so large relative to the other units, and in several relevant dimensions. 
But a large, unified, economically important Germany is fact, and any discussion 
of and movements toward European economic and political integration must 
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incorporate this fact, along with predicted consequences, in any adjustment 
process. 
In a genuinely competitive federal union or federalism, of the sort that I 
have suggested, Germany can dominate the totality only to the extent that its 
policíes insure relatively superior performance. Consider, as perhaps the primary 
example, the role and influence of the Bundesbank in a competitive federalism, in 
which each member country retains its own currency and central bank, but where 
citizens can make contracts in any currency of their choice. Widespread fears 
that the deutsche mark would come to be the only monetary unit over all Europe 
would be realized only if the other central banks failed to match the Bundesbank 
in meeting the objective of stabilizing the value of the separate monies. At the 
same time, the existence of these other central banks would place external 
discipline on the Bundesbank itself, holding its inflationary proclivities in check 
should these emerge unexpectedly in some future setting. 
Consider, by contrast, the setting envisaged by Maastricht, in which all of 
Europe operates with a single monetary unit, issued by a single European central 
bank. In this situation, the relative size of Germany would insure, if influence 
should be at all "fairly" allocated in terms of relative size, that German members 
be placed in dominating roles. In a single European central bank, essentially the 
carryover of Bundesbank attitudes and practices would seem to be the most likely 
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result. Further, in such a setting, there would be no external discipline that could 
operate to hold the inflationary proclivities of such a monetary authority in check. 
Essentially the same point may be extended in application to any and all 
powers of regulation that might or might not be assigned to the central authority 
of the emerging federalism. In a competitive federalism, each country would 
reta in powers of economic regulation internal to its own territory, with the 
requirement that individuals and firms be allowed entry and exit into and from all 
markets over Europe. This scheme would be advantageous for all countries, but 
especially advantageous to the relatively small units. Germany, perhaps along 
with France, could not dictate or even influence much the regulatory atmosphere 
in, say, Portugal or Greece. 
By contrast, consider the noncompetitive or centralized federalism, as 
envisaged by the past attitudes of the Brussels bureaucracy. Regulation would 
be imposed by the central federal authority, and the particulars of this regulation 
would, indeed, be subject to dominant influence by the large and important 
countries. German dominance would, indeed, be a matter of concern in this 
situation. In this sense, it seems to me.imperative that the relatively small 
countries in the European union insist on the competitive structure to the maximal 
extent that is possible. 
• 
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VII. Conclusion 
To an outsider, an American observer, there are many reasons why 
Europeans should seize the opportunity for integration that history now offers to 
them. These reasons may vary as among the separated nation-states, although 
the universally applicable benefits promised by an extension of the effective 
market nexus should appeal to citizens of all countries. These purely economic 
benefits of integration look as relatively more important for those citizens of the 
smaller national units, but it is noteworthy that the spontaneous adjustments 
driven in part by modern technology seem to be operating to make'economic 
integration a natural process. 
For the larger nation-states, there are extra-economic considerations that 
must enter int(¡ evaluation of movements toward full membership in a competitive 
European federalism. Many German citizens look on Europeanization as a 
means to insure, structurally and constitutionally, against a possible future 
emergence of their own nationalistic excesses. And many French citizens view 
Europeanization as the avenue through which the German threat may finally be 
internalized. The French must learn, however, that a viable federal Europe will 
not, and should not, emerge under the dominance of a Frenchified Brussels 
bureaucracy. The British must somehow come to understand that membership in 
a competitive federalism need not involve the surrender of internal political 
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control, save to the extent that such control exceeds the limits suggested by the 
discipline of competitive survival in an inclusive open market. 
Italy and the Italians are interesting in their confrontation with an emergent 
federal Europe. The promised economic benefits are, of course, important here, 
but, for Italians, the external discipline upon their internal politics that would be 
imposed by membership in Europe may be of overriding value. That is to say, 
Italian constitutional reform may become possible only if Europeanization and the 
accompanying competition with other member sta tes forces it. 
M)' own emphasis is upon the middle way. European competitive 
federalism falls between the alternatives of (1) a highly centralized, constructivist, 
.and regularized Europe, with authority lodged in a Brussels bureaucracy, and 
(2) a Europe of fully sovoreign nalion slates, with economic integration only as it 
may be continually supported by the separated politics within each state. In 
. 
either of these alternatives, the major benefits promised from integration will fail 
to be realized. The middle or third way is that of a genuinely competitive 
federalism, in which a strong central authority is established, but with severely 
limited powers that are carefully set out. in formal constitutional documents 
enforcible in a European court. 
